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Thomas Reid is one of the primary early expositors of the “dual-component” theory
of perception, according to which conscious perception constitutively involves a
non-intentional sensation accompanied by a noninferential perceptual belief. In this
paper, I will explore Reid’s account of olfactory perception, and of odor as a secondary
quality. Reid is often taken to endorse a broadly Lockean picture of secondary qualities,
according to which they are simply dispositions to cause sensations. This picture creates
problems, however, for Reid’s account of how we perceive secondary qualities, including
odors. Given Reid’s insistence that we come to be aware of odors only by inferring a
causal relation to obtain between them and our olfactory sensations, it seems that he
cannot allow for direct, noninferential perceptual awareness of odors. Since his general
account of perception invokes noninferential perceptual beliefs to explain perceptual
awareness, it seems that Reid must either reject this general account for the case
of olfactory perception (and supplant it with something else), or else deny that we
ever actually perceive odors. I will attempt to reconcile these ideas by appeal to Reid’s
doctrine of “acquired perception,” which involves the incorporation of learned conceptual
representations into perceptual states via perceptual learning. Reidian acquired perception
enables genuine olfactory perceptual acquaintance with odors despite the dependence of
the semantic properties of the relevant representations on causal relations to sensations.
In exploring these issues, I hope to illuminate several features of Reid’s account of
perception and demonstrate its interest to contemporary theorizing about conscious
perception—especially olfaction—in the process. Reid’s theory of olfaction remains a live,
coherent option for present-day theorists.
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“OF SMELLING”
In a letter to Hugh Blair, dated 4 July 1762, David Hume com-
mented on the manuscript of Thomas Reid’s first major philo-
sophical work, An inquiry into the human mind on the principles
of common sense (‘IHM’). Hume complimented its literary qual-
ities, but noted that “there seems to be some Defect in Method”
(IHM Appendix 1.1, 256). “For instance,” Hume offered, “under
the Article of Smelling, he gives you a Glimpse of all the Depths
of his Philosophy” (Ibid.).
Reid took a thorough investigation of perception to be funda-
mental to a proper philosophical understanding of how the mind
works. Besides the introduction and conclusion, each chapter of
IHM is devoted to one of the five senses. Reasoning that it “is
so difficult to unravel the operations of the human understand-
ing” that we cannot expect to succeed except by “beginning with
the simplest, and proceeding by very cautious steps to the most
complex,” Reid begins with a chapter on olfaction, “Of smelling”
(IHM 2.1, 25). As Hume noted, the chapter is rich and disparate
in its contents; it is larger than the chapters on gustation and audi-
tion combined, and is nearly as long as the chapter on tactition
(the chapter on vision, perhaps unsurprisingly, dwarfs them all).
In this paper, I will explore Reid’s theory of olfactory per-
ception as a special—and especially pure—case of his theory
of the perception of secondary qualities generally. His theory
of secondary-quality perception, including olfaction, appears to
have serious problems. My aim by the end of the paper is to
provide an understanding of Reid’s account of olfactory per-
ception (and secondary-quality perception in general) that does
justice to his general theory of perception and his notion of
odors1 and the other secondary qualities2. Hume’s remark is apt;
1The term “odor” is sometimes used to refer to qualities of external objects,
and ptsometimes to refer to particular clouds of airborne particles or locations
(see Batty, 2010a,b). Following what I take Reid’s standard usage to be, I typ-
ically use the term to refer to qualities of objects; hopefully, not much hangs
on this terminological point.
2Olfaction is of special interest in understanding Reid’s account of secondary-
quality perception, and not simply because Reid takes it to be the proper initial
area of inquiry into perception. Vision and tactition involve perception of
both primary and secondary qualities, and Reid says very little about gusta-
tion aside from likening it to olfaction. Gustation is also arguably wrapped up
with tactition in a way that olfaction is not. Reid’s discussion about audition,
though useful in understanding his account of secondary-quality perception,
is also largely about language and Reid’s doctrine of natural signs. Olfaction
is thus useful because, on Reid’s account, it appears to be a sense purely dedi-
cated to a particular kind of secondary quality. Furthermore, I will argue that
Reidian olfactory perception is entirely acquired and in no part innate (see
Two Solutions and Olfactory Perceptual Acquaintance), whereas this is false
of vision and tactition and not obviously the case for audition—for exam-
ple, Reid seems to believe in an innate faculty for the auditory perception of
musical qualities (IHM 4.2, 50). Understanding Reid’s account of olfactory
perception is useful, therefore, because it is purely a matter of the acquired
perception of a particular kind of secondary quality. Given its simplicity as
well as Reid’s special interest in it, olfaction is uniquely suited to provide an
understanding of Reidian secondary-quality perception.
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understanding Reid’s theory of olfaction will require calling upon
many other aspects of Reid’s theory of perception and his general
philosophy of mind.
The following discussion is historical in nature, but it will
be valuable to many who are interested in olfactory perception,
and the perception of secondary-qualities generally. As will be
explained below, problems for Reid’s account arise from the con-
junction of two theses that many hold today: that perception is
partly a matter of noninferential intentional awareness of qual-
ities of external objects, and that odors are dispositions (or the
bases of dispositions) to cause sensations. If the discussion below
is correct, then these theses can be comfortably reconciled, which
should be of interest to contemporary theorists. Furthermore,
I will explore Reid’s theory of “acquired” perception, which
occurs when learned contents are incorporated into perceptual
experience. This controversial idea is also part of contemporary
philosophical discussion (see, for example, Churchland, 1979),
and solving problems that arise for Reid’s account will aid in
understanding the nature of acquired perception. Finally, I will
explain how Reidian olfactory perception accommodates both
the qualitative and representational aspects of olfactory percep-
tual experience, while making minimal ontological commitments
about the nature of odor. Clarifying and understanding Reid’s
theory of olfactory perception sheds light on all these contem-
porary issues, and provides a coherent and arguably attractive
account of olfaction.
SETTING UP THE PROBLEM
PERCEPTION
Reid thinks the senses each deserve their own investigation, but
he does have a general outline of how perception works, which
Wolterstorff (2001) calls the Standard Schema. According to the
schema, perception is amatter of having a sensation, which has no
intentional content and is individuated by its felt quality, and then
noninferentially forming a “conception and belief” of an external
object and/or its properties, relations, and so on. Similar views
of perception crop up quite frequently throughout the history of
philosophy. The idea that perceptual awareness of outer objects is
a matter of sensations giving rise to conceptual representations is
perhaps most often identified with Kant. It was endorsed in the
20th century by Sellars (1956), and it (or something very close to
it) is held by his various philosophical inheritors, e.g., Churchland
(1979); Rosenthal (2005), and Coates (2007). Though Reid often
receives credit for the origination of the view and the sharp
sensation–perception distinction it licenses, A. D. Smith, who
refers to the theory as the dual-component view, claims to find
it earlier in the work of Malebranche, Digby, and sargeant (Smith,
2002, 284n17). Kuehn (1987) makes a strong historical case that
the similarities between Reid and Kant are in fact due to a direct,
as well as indirect, Reidian influence on Kant’s thought.
It is crucial for Reid’s general picture of perception that the
intentional component of perception (the conception and belief)3
3When I refer to the intentional component of perception, or to perceptual
intentionality, I mean to refer to the conception–belief element of perceptual
awareness.When I refer to perceptual awareness, I generally mean the complex
of sensation and intentionality.
make one immediately or directly aware of external objects and
their properties. One of Reid’s stated purposes in philosophy
is to avoid succumbing to the theory of ideas, according to
which (as Reid understands it) perceiving external objects is a
matter of directly and noninferentially perceiving some mental
entity—an idea, in Locke’s and Berkeley’s terminology, or an
impression in Hume’s—and positing a relation of some kind
to obtain between the mental entity and some object in the
world, or else leaving out the external world altogether. Reid took
Berkeley and Hume to infer their radical epistemological and
metaphysical conclusions from this premise, and thought their
inferences valid. He saw this as a good sign that the premise
was likely false, and tried to build another account of percep-
tion and knowledge that would explain the relevant phenomena
equally well, and without what he saw as highly implausible
conclusions4.
Reid’s account of perceptual intentionality is direct in two
senses that are relevant to the ensuing discussion. First, the inten-
tional component of perception is noninferential. It does not arise
out of any process that could reasonably be called inference, and
in that respect it constitutes a direct awareness of the object rep-
resented. Second, perceptual intentionality is, to borrow a phrase
from Tyler Burge, “referentially non-derivative” (Burge, 2005, p.
30). That is, it does not refer to its object in virtue of refer-
ring to something else. In Acquired Acquaintance, I will place
more restrictive conditions on perceptual awareness, but for now,
these two ways in which, for Reid, the intentional component of
perception is direct will suffice.
SECONDARY QUALITIES
One of the few things Reid agrees with Locke about is the
legitimacy of the distinction between primary and secondary
qualities. He does not agree, however, with Locke’s way of draw-
ing the distinction. For Locke, the mental states that stand for
primary qualities “are resemblances of them,” whereas ideas of
secondary qualities “have no resemblance of them at all” (Locke,
1690, p. 2.8.15, 137). Reid, conversely, does not think mental
states can ever resemble qualities of external objects, so nei-
ther primary nor secondary qualities resemble our sensations
or perceptions of them (see IHM 5.8, 75; Van Cleve, 2011);
to think otherwise, for Reid, is to make a basic category error
that reveals deep philosophical confusion. For Reid, the dis-
tinction between primary and secondary qualities has to do,
at least in part, with the kinds of understanding we have of
different qualities of objects. With respect to the primary qual-
ities, we have “a direct and distinct notion,” but of secondary
qualities “only a relative notion, which must, because it is only
relative, be obscure” (EIP 2.17, 202). Our notions of secondary
qualities are relative because such qualities “are conceived only
as the unknown causes or occasions of certain sensations with
which we are well acquainted” (Ibid.); because the causes are
unknown, they are obscure to us. There is an interesting debate
in the secondary literature on Reid as to whether his ontological
account of secondary qualities has them as dispositions to cause
4See, e.g., the letter to the earl of Findlater and Seafield that opens IHM for
Reid’s announcement of his intentions in this regard (IHM Dedication, 3–6).
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research December 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 974 | 2
Quilty-Dunn Reid on olfaction
sensations or as the bases of those dispositions 5. In either case,
however, it is clear that we only really think there are secondary
qualities at all in virtue of positing a causal relation to obtain
between them and our sensations, and that our ordinary knowl-
edge of them does not progress beyond that relative and obscure
notion.
THE PROBLEM
Perhaps the problem is already clear. On the one hand, Reid says
perceptual intentionality is not based on inference, and refers
to its objects non-derivatively, i.e., not in virtue of referring to
anything else. On the other hand, Reid says our notions of sec-
ondary qualities like odors are not direct, and are ostensibly
based on our inferring there to be external qualities that cause
our sensations. Our awareness of secondary qualities, such as
it is, appears therefore to be both inferential and referentially
dependent on sensations. There has been considerable contro-
versy about whether Reidian sensations’ mediating perceptual
intentionality, as occurs even in the perception of primary qual-
ities, renders Reid’s general view of perception indirect in some
Lockean sense6. I am not interested in that question here, however.
Given that the very content of our notion of a secondary quality
such as odor is dependent on an inference from awareness of sen-
sations, for Reid, it seems impossible that we could ever actually
perceive odors or any secondary qualities at all on his view. This is
the conundrum. Van Cleve (in press) argues that the proposition
that perception is immediate, the proposition that our notions of
secondary qualities are relative and obscure, and the proposition
that we can perceive secondary qualities, form an inconsistent
triad.
TWO SOLUTIONS
ORIGINAL AND ACQUIRED PERCEPTION
I will sketch two possible solutions to the problem just raised,
one that relies on nativism (which Reid generally endorsed), and
one that relies on perceptual learning. First, it will be helpful to
explain a crucial aspect of Reid’s philosophy, namely, the distinc-
tion between original and acquired perception. As mentioned in
the previous section, Reidian perception occurs when sensations
give rise to noninferential intentional states that take external
things as their objects. It is an open question to what extent
the patterns of mental causation that relate sensations to per-
ceptual intentional states are learned, and to what extent they
are innate. Wilfrid Sellars, who seems to endorse the same broad
view of perceptual awareness 7, argues that the very capacity to
have intentional states is entirely learned, and so he would deny
5The “base” view seems more popular. For articulations and defenses of that
view, see (Lehrer, 1989; Wolterstorff, 2001; McKitrick, 2002); for the disposi-
tional view, see Van Cleve (2011). For what it’s worth, I think the base view
is likely the correct interpretation of Reid, but since I am here only con-
cerned with the perception of secondary qualities and not with their ontology,
nothing hereafter should hang on it.
6See (Wolterstorff, 2001; Buras, 2002; Smith, 2002; Van Cleve, 2002, 2004).
For defense of Reid’s direct realism, see Copenhaver (2004), Quilty-Dunn
(2013).
7See (Smith, 2002), Chapter 2, for an interesting critical discussion of Reid
and Sellars, and of the similarities between the two.
that the relevant causal connections between the sensory and
intentional components of perception are innate to any extent
(Sellars, 1956). Reid, on the other hand, endorses a strong form
of nativism, according to which certain kinds of sensations give
rise to certain kinds of intentional states due to the nature “of
our constitution” (see, e.g., IHM 5.2, 56). Reid calls this sort of
perception “original perception” (e.g., IHM 6.21, 177), and con-
trasts it with “acquired perception,” which occurs when the causal
connections between the sensory and the intentional compo-
nents of perception are acquired through habituation (e.g., IHM
6.21, 177–178).
There are some uncontroversial examples of qualities that
are perceived through original perception, but they are few
in number, and are, somewhat surprisingly, mostly propri-
etary to tactition. They include tactile perception of tex-
ture, solidity, shape, motion, and what Reid calls “hardness,”
which is the propensity of a body to resist deformation in
response to pressure (IHM, Chapter 5). They also include the
visual perception of what Reid calls the “visible figures” of
objects (IHM 6.22, 186), which are two-dimensional forms
that operate according to a non-Euclidean spherical geometry
(IHM 6.9) 8 . Uncontroversial examples of acquired perception
include the visual perception of three-dimensional figure (which
Reid calls “real figure,” and also, because it is originally per-
ceived only through tactition, “tangible figure”). They also
include perceiving what are today called higher-level proper-
ties, or as Siegel (2011) calls them, “K-properties.” According
to Reid, of all our perceptual capacities, “the far greater
part is acquired, and the fruit of experience” (EIP 2.21, 235;
italics his).
The farmer perceives by his eye, very nearly, the quantity of hay
in a rick, or of corn in a heap. The sailor sees the burthen, the
built, and the distance of a ship at sea, while she is a great way off.
Every man accustomed to writing, distinguishes his acquaintance
by their hand-writing, as he does by their faces. And the painter
distinguishes in the works of his art, the style of all the great mas-
ters. In a word, acquired perception is very different in different
persons, according to the diversity of the objects about which they
are employed, and the application they bestow in observing them.
(IHM 6.20, 172)
It is not obvious how olfactory perception fits into the original–
acquired dichotomy. I will describe two ways of solving the
problem of olfactory perception, one according to which olfactory
perception is acquired, and another according to which odors are
perceived originally. The acquired story is superior, though it will
require some work to make sense of it.
8This led Reid to develop a fascinating and ingenious sketch of a non-
Euclidean geometry in 1764 (IHM 6.9), several decades before such projects
were incorporated intomainstreamWesternmathematics [Daniels (1974); see
Yaffe (2002) for a thorough discussion]. It was not well-recognized as fasci-
nating or ingenious at the time. Joseph Priestley, in his critical examination
of Reid’s IHM, remarked, “I do not remember to have seen a more egregious
piece of solemn trifling than the chapter which our author calls the “Geometry
of Visibles” (Priestley, 1775, p. 99–100).
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ACQUIRED OLFACTORY PERCEPTION
By far the more popular solution in the secondary literature is to
interpret Reid as saying that secondary qualities are perceived only
via acquired perception. This approach is endorsed by, at least,
Lehrer (1978), McKitrick (2002), Nichols (2007), Buras (2009).
As McKitrick says, we “do not originally perceive secondary qual-
ities, except as unknown causes of sensations. It is not a part of
our original constitution that sensations produced by secondary
qualities give us perceptions of those qualities as they are in them-
selves” (McKitrick, 2002, p. 493). On the contrary, according to
this interpretation, our conception of secondary qualities is in the
first instance a theoretical inference from our sensations to their
causes.We can only come to perceive secondary qualities by incor-
porating this conception into occurrent perceptions. Since Reid
says “our senses give us only a relative and indirect notion” of sec-
ondary qualities (EIP 2.17, 201), it seems natural to say that, in
terms of original perception, we do not have any sort of direct
perceptual awareness of odors. Acquired perception would thus
be required to supplement our endowed perceptual capacities.
The problem with this route is that it does not seem immedi-
ately to avoid the crucial problem of the perception of secondary
qualities. The problem, recall, is this: if our conception of sec-
ondary qualities is an inference from our sensations to some
unknown outer cause, and if perceptual intentionality must be
noninferential and referentially non-derivative, then we cannot
perceive secondary qualities. McKitrick simply says that such per-
ception is “mediated” by our awareness of sensations (McKitrick,
2002, p. 494; see also Nichols, 2007, p. 169)—but of course, by
Reid’s measure of what constitutes perception, such “perception”
is not really perception. It is just an inference based on aware-
ness of a mental entity, e.g., an olfactory sensation. According
to Nichols, “our perceptual beliefs about primary qualities con-
form to a non−inferential theory” of perceptual knowledge, while
those about secondary qualities do not (Nichols, 2007, p. 215).
There is a way out of this problem. It is crucial to distinguish
between a given notion’s referring to type A by means of reference
to a relation to type B, and a token intentional state’s referring to
a token of A by means of a token of B. Less abstractly, there is a
difference between our notion of a given type of odor, O, having
the content, The kind of property that causes sensations of type O∗,
and my occurrent awareness of the instance of O in my environ-
ment being referentially derivative of my awareness of my token
sensation of O∗ 9. These two ideas are doubly dissociable. On the
one hand, my notion of rain is not referentially or inferentially
dependent on my notion of a lawn chair cushion’s being wet, but
my occurrent belief that it rained might be based on an inference
from the wetness of the cushion. On the other hand, and more
importantly for the case of olfactory perception, my notion of
what it is to be an odor of type O might be wholly dependent
on O’s bearing certain relations to sensations, but my occurrent
perceptual belief that there is an instance of O before me need
not be an inference from my awareness of a token O∗ sensation.
9Following a somewhat standard notation, I use a letter to denote a type
of quality of external objects, and the same letter followed by an asterisk to
denote the type of sensation that corresponds to it.
This latter case is enabled by the possibility of acquired per-
ception, whereby conceptions formed initially through inference
or some other non-innate procedure can become noninferential
constituents of perceptual intentional states. For instance, where
I might once have thought there was a car in the street because
I thought a car was the likely cause of my sensations, through per-
ceptual learning, I gain the capacity to form, noninferentially, an
auditory perception as of a car in the street10, 11.
The case is confused with olfaction (and other secondary qual-
ities) because the semantics of our conception of a given odor O
involves a description of a relation it stands in to sensations. That
seems to imply that becoming aware of O in perception is really
just a matter of introspectively becoming aware of sensations and
positing such a relation to obtain between my present sensations
and some odor in the environment. But that simply does not fol-
low. If sensations can noninferentially give rise to conceptions,
then a sensation of type O∗ could noninferentially give rise to a
conception of O; in that case, my awareness of O will not be an
inference from O∗. It will just also happen to be the case, given
the vagaries of olfaction, that my notion of what O is depends on
its relations to O∗, and my acquisition of that notion did depend
on inference from O∗ sensations.
The semantics of our conception of odor can be derivative
from our awareness of sensations without making every instance
of our perceptual awareness of odors being so derivative. The
primary function of acquired perception, for Reid, is to enable
inferential awareness to transform into noninferential perception.
The particularly indirect and relative semantics of our concep-
tions of olfactory properties obscures this point in the case of
olfactory perception, but there as elsewhere, our indirect concep-
tions can become incorporated into perceptual awareness, thus
yielding direct perception of odors in the environment with-
out being mediated by occurrent awareness of token sensations.
Though the semantics of our conception of O is referentially
derivative at the level of types—that is, our conception refers to
odors of type O via referring to a relation that obtains between
such odors and sensations of type O∗—the token representation
of O that figures in an acquired olfactory perception would be
referentially non-derivative at the token level, since it does not
refer to the token instance of O in the environment in virtue of
referring to a token O∗ sensation. No token acquired perception,
therefore, is referentially derivative of any token sensation, even
if the type of which the perceptual representation is a token is
referentially derivative of sensation-types.
The acquisition of our conceptions of odors would, in this
story, be causally dependent on our already being able to form
conceptions of objects, perhaps via original perceptions of their
primary qualities. We may, in the first instance, be perceptu-
ally aware of objects by means of their primary qualities and
10Of course, whether I need to have the sensations first is a separate question,
and has no bearing on the inference/reference point. A token sensation can
causally precede a perceptual intentional state without being referred to or
rendering the intentional component of perception inferential; indeed, that is
how Reidian perception typically functions.
11For a primer on the psychology of perceptual learning, see Kellman and
Garrigan (2009).
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also be aware of our olfactory sensations; we may then posit
some unknown quality in the objects we perceive that is causally
responsible for our olfactory sensations. Through a gradual trial-
and-error learning process, we form fine-grained conceptions
of odors, and through the process of perceptual learning, we
become able to trigger these conceptions in acquired perceptions
without undergoing any inference or making reference to our
occurrent olfactory sensations. A passage where Reid discusses the
acquisition of our conceptions of colors provides a helpful analog:
By the constitution of nature, we are led to conceive this [color
sensation] as a sign of something external. A thousand experi-
ments for this purpose are made each day by children, even before
they come to the use of reason. They look at things, they handle
them, they put them in various positions, at different distances,
and in different lights. The [sensations] of sight, by these means,
become associated with, and readily to suggest, things external,
and altogether unlike them. In particular, that [sensation] which
we have called the appearance of color, suggests the conception
and belief of some unknown quality, which occasions the idea;
and it is to this quality, and not to the [sensation], that we give
the name of color.
(IHM 6.4, 86)
ORIGINAL OLFACTORY PERCEPTION?
One could argue that there is original perception of some sec-
ondary qualities. Van Cleve suggests that perhaps original per-
ception of secondary qualities can be said to occur if it allows
for the subject to locate the instance of the quality in space. As
he observes, however, this would rule out olfaction if we “have
no such innate ability to localize the causes of our olfactory
sensations” (Van Cleve, in press).
Reid seems to say, however, that though olfaction and audi-
tion do not enable original localization, they still involve original
perception:
In smelling, and in hearing, we have a sensation or impression
upon the mind, which, by our constitution, we conceive to be a
sign of something external: but the position of this external thing,
with regard to the organ of sense, is not presented to the mind
along with the sensation.
(IHM 6.8, 99)
Van Cleve suggests that we may “have an original perception to
the effect that some quality exists that is causing our sensation or,
more colloquially, that a certain scent is in the air,”12 and that “one
could even be said to have an objectual perception of the scent
or quality itself, without knowing where it resides” (Van Cleve,
in press)13.
12Batty argues that olfaction represents odors (conceived of as particulars in
the ambient environment, rather than qualities of objects) as being “here”
[2010a, p. 524–525; see also Batty (2010b), Richardson (2013)].
13Lycan, similarly, says there is no analog of stereopsis in olfaction, despite
the presence of two nostrils and olfactory bulbs, which is a mere “super-
fluity” (Lycan, 2000, 287n12). This is probably incorrect. Porter et al. (2007)
found that the distance between the nostrils facilitates different odor sampling
in each nostril; furthermore, they showed that scent-tracking in humans is
significantly worse when odors are equally distributed between both nostrils.
The question would immediately arise, of course, as to whether
the awareness we come to form of the odor is actually just an
inference from our awareness of the sensation. Reid seems to
talk as though it is inferential when he says that the senses origi-
nally give us only a relative and indirect notion of odor. Perhaps,
on the other hand, the account could work in the exact oppo-
site direction from the acquired-perception account. That is,
instead of saying we gain a notion of odor through inferences
from sensations, and then incorporate it into perception through
perceptual learning, yielding noninferential perceptual awareness
of odors, we could say that we begin with such noninferential
perceptual awareness of odors, and through exploring what our
notion of an odor is, develop an indirect and relative notion. This
story is undeveloped as it stands, but there is nothing internally
inconsistent in it.
Nonetheless, the nativist story leaves the origin of our capac-
ity to represent odors noninferentially unexplained, whereas the
acquired-perception story explains it in terms of our inferentially
taking there to be causes of our sensations and eventually com-
ing to represent such causes noninferentially without referring
to token sensations. Indeed, though the passage quoted above
in this section does speak of “our constitution” and thus sug-
gests original perception, it could be that Reid simply means we
have a natural tendency to posit causes of our sensations, as he
says children theorize about the causes of color sensations. The
acquired account is preferable on the theoretical grounds that
it enables a fuller explanation of how olfactory perception takes
place, and there does not appear to be textual evidence that cuts
unambiguously against it. Furthermore, Reid’s criteria for posit-
ing innate psychological laws include the inability to explain the
relevant psychological phenomena “by tradition, by education, or
by experience” (IHM 5.2, 58). The mere existence of a coherent
and explanatorily efficacious account of olfaction in terms of per-
ceptual learning would thus suffice by Reid’s own lights to make
a nativist explanation unnecessary. There are serious (though
surmountable) problems for the acquired account, however, to
which I turn now.
ACQUIRED ACQUAINTANCE
ACQUIRED PERCEPTION NOT PERCEPTION?
One might be inclined to challenge the idea that acquired per-
ception is actually perception. The argument arises because lots of
cases that seem to fit the criteria for acquired perception do not
seem like perception. For van Cleve, for example, one’s awareness
of the external environment should only be considered perceptual
awareness if it involves “conception of the acquaintance variety”
(Van Cleve, 2004, in press), which he argues acquired percep-
tion does not involve. As noted above, perception, according
to Reid, involves “conception and belief.” Conception is simply
the intentionality-providing component of all intentional men-
tal states; it may therefore be open to further debate whether it
involves conceptual representation in something like the contem-
porary sense (Alston, 1989). Of course, Reid does always talk of
conception in perception as paired with belief, perhaps suggest-
ing that it is a form of intentional content that can figure in a
belief (and thus, perhaps trivially, that it is conceptual in nature).
However, he also talks of conception occurring by itself, in cases
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of “simple apprehension,” which for Reid is merely having a thing
in mind, without predicating anything of it such that one’s men-
tal state is truth-evaluable (EIP 1.7, 65). It thus seems possible to
construe different kinds of conception as involving different sorts
of contents (Alston, 1989). One might, therefore, argue that what
distinguishes perception from mere belief is the kind of concep-
tion or awareness involved, perhaps in terms of nonconceptual
content (e.g., Copenhaver, 2010; Quilty-Dunn, 2013).
The immediate question is, what forms of awareness constitute
acquaintance? Perhaps we can characterize perceptual acquain-
tance without taking a stand on the kind of content involved in
the relevant state14 . The term “acquaintance” evokes a heavy load
of Russellian baggage—van Cleve says he means it “in something
like Russell’s sense” (Van Cleve, in press). In order to under-
stand the proposal better, I will turn briefly to Russell’s notion
of acquaintance. Russell says, “I am acquainted with an object
when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e., when
I am directly aware of the object itself” (Russell, 1910, p. 108).
For Russell, of course, the objects with which we are directly
related must be sense-data, and cannot be ordinary outer objects.
When discussing the perception of external objects and their
qualities, then, we can put that assumption aside. Russell also
attaches unique epistemic significance to acquaintance.When one
is acquainted with an object, “no further knowledge of it itself is
even theoretically possible” (Russell, 1912, Ch. 5, 32). Again, this
aspect of Russellian acquaintance simply could not extend to the
perception of external objects.While Reid would certainly say that
knowledge of objects gained through perception occupies a spe-
cial epistemic position, there is little reason to saddle Reid with
the false view that perceptual knowledge is unimprovable, since
we could always get a better view on an external object, and gain
further, more accurate, and more complete knowledge of it and
its properties. Relatedly, one could (along Russell’s lines) endorse
perceptual acquaintance as intrinsically veridical, and so if there
is no object, there could not be perceptual acquaintance at all.
This view in contemporary philosophy of perception is called dis-
junctivism (see, e.g., Burge, 2005; Martin, 2006; Brewer, 2011).
It seems unlikely that Reid held such a view. First of all, Reidian
perception is a complex of sensation and belief, which seems
quite different from the nonrepresentational relation posited by
disjunctivists. Second, there is no textual evidence to my knowl-
edge that would license attributing disjunctivism to Reid. If an
account of perceptual acquaintance can be constructed that does
not involve a commitment to disjunctivism, it would therefore
seem to be preferable.
Below, I will propose four conditions for perceptual acquain-
tance. I believe they capture the spirit of van Cleve’s invocation
of the Russellian notion, shorn of the baggage discharged in the
previous paragraph. All four conditions can be applied to percep-
tual awareness of external objects (and not just sense-data), and
indeed to Reidian acquired perception. These are not intended
to be necessary or sufficient conditions. Rather, what follows is a
sort of grab bag of properties that seem to mark many cases of
14As has been noted (see, e.g., Byrne, 2005), the conceptual/nonconceptual
distinction could apply to the kind of content or the kind of state involved. I
hope here to avoid making any claims on either side.
perceptual acquaintance. The justification for appealing to these
properties and not others is simply that they appear to character-
ize the cases that we would want to call perceptual acquaintance,
and do not characterize cases that we wouldn’t. The validity of
these conditions should be judged on a case-by-case basis, to
see whether they tend to apply where (and only where) we want
them to.
CONDITIONS FOR PERCEPTUAL ACQUAINTANCE
First of all, acquaintance could be understood as involving phe-
nomenal immediacy. By that I mean simply that our conscious
awareness of the object is not preceded by a separate awareness of
something else. This is presumably what Russell has inmindwhen
he says one is “directly aware of the object itself” (Russell, 1910,
p. 108). Since acquired perception involves noninferential percep-
tual beliefs that seem to the subject to be automatically activated
and not to refer to their objects in virtue of referring to anything
else, then the awareness they engender presents itself to the sub-
ject simply as an immediate awareness of a state of affairs in the
environment.
Second, the relevant state could involve acquaintance if it
is psychologically noninferential. This notion of acquaintance is
similar to, though separate from, the point about phenomenal
immediacy. Whereas that point has to do with whether the sub-
ject’s conscious awareness of the object is manifestly derivative of
her awareness of something else, psychological noninferentiality
is simply a matter of the actual underlying psychological pro-
cesses that give rise to the relevant intentional state. We can thus
partially provide criteria for an intentional state’s constituting
acquaintance by stipulating that such states cannot arise through
a psychological process of inference.
Third, acquaintance could be partially constituted by being
directly causally related to the object. The object itself, and its qual-
ities that are perceived, play a special and constitutive role in the
causal process that brings about one’s perceptual awareness. It is
because the object is triangular that I represent it as triangular; I
thus stand in a relation to it not merely of being accurately aware
of its qualities, but also of its being responsible for my being so
aware. Though one might take the acquaintance relation to be
metaphysically thicker in some sense, it seems fair to say that the
object’s F-ness being directly causally responsible for one’s veridi-
cal perception of its F-ness does justice to Russell’s insistence on
the acquaintance relation as one of “presentation” (Russell, 1910,
p. 109). We can simply understand an object’s presenting itself
to us as a function of its causal efficacy in producing occurrent
veridical perceptual awareness of it.
Fourth, acquaintance could be a matter of sensory character.
This condition is a bit more difficult for Reid, who makes a
sharp separation between the sensory component of perceptual
awareness and the intentional component. Nonetheless, percep-
tual intentionality could be said to have a sensory character on
a Reidian view insofar as the relevant intentional states are inti-
mately tied to the qualitative character of sensations. Sensations
and perceptual intentionality are, of course, metaphysically inde-
pendent for Reid. There are still two important ways in which the
qualitative character of sensations colors perceptual intentional-
ity. On the one hand, sensations bear tight causal relations to
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the intentional components of perceptual awareness. Perceptual
intentionality can thus be individuated from other forms of inten-
tionality via its unique causal situation with respect to sensations.
On the other hand, Reid often stresses that it is highly difficult,
and perhaps sometimes impossible, introspectively to separate
the relevant contributions to the felt character of a perceptual
state. That is, from the first person, it is extremely unnatural
and difficult to isolate the sensory component and the intentional
component. Reidian perceptual experience presents itself to con-
sciousness as a package deal, a unified sensory presentation of
external objects and states of affairs. One might object to this
last point that acquaintance is a first-order property of percep-
tion, and not a matter of the way in which one has a higher-order
awareness of it. I do not see why this must be the case, how-
ever. There does not seem to be a principled reason to deny that
an intentional state’s constituting acquaintance could be partly
a matter of its higher-order relational properties, i.e., the way
in which it presents itself to consciousness and introspection 15
. Indeed, given that Russellian acquaintance is a function of the
way in which the subject relates to her own mental states, it does
not seem very revisionary to construe acquaintance in this way.
Something that may strike the reader about the above crite-
ria for acquaintance is that they are all a function of extrinsic
properties of perceptual intentionality, and not of its intrinsic
properties. Phenomenal immediacy consists in the perceptual
intentional state’s not seeming to the subject to depend on aware-
ness of something else; psychological noninferentiality is a matter
of the state’s not arising through an inferential process; direct
causal relations to the object are straightforwardly extrinsic and
relational; and sensory character is constituted both by the state’s
causal ties to sensations as well as its higher-order relational prop-
erty of being typically phenomenally bound up with sensation, as
far as consciousness and introspection are concerned. One may
object that acquaintance should be wholly a matter of the intrin-
sic properties of a given state of awareness. It does not seem,
however, that there is a principled reason to enforce such tight
strictures on an account of what perceptual acquaintance consists
in. Furthermore, it should be regarded as a rather considerable
benefit that the extrinsic notions of acquaintance allow us to
get some sort of independent theoretical traction on the idea of
acquaintance, enabling us to get clearer on what we mean when
we talk about being perceptually acquainted with objects and
putting us in a better position to decide whether a particular case
involves such acquaintance.
The above account is not intended to be complete.
Nonetheless, the four proposed characteristics—actually five,
considering that sensory character involves two different ways in
which sensations leave their mark on perceptual intentionality—
put us in a better position for understanding what acquain-
tance is, and for deciding on whether a given case constitutes
15Consciousness, for Reid, as a mental operation, is noninferential higher-
order awareness. For discussion of whether Reid thought that higher-order
views offered the right theory of what it is for a state to be conscious —which
is a separate question—see Copenhaver (2007). This is not the place, however,
to offer an interpretation of Reid’s theory of consciousness (if he held one at
all).
acquaintance. To repeat, these conditions are not intended to be
necessary and sufficient; it could be that none are necessary and
none are individually sufficient, and that certain clusters are suffi-
cient for acquaintance16. By way of vindicating these conditions, I
will now argue that there are cases of acquired perception that
fulfill them and that the cases that worry van Cleve (e.g., see-
ing his wife is home by virtue of seeing her keys on the table)
do not. Perhaps some of Reid’s examples of acquired perception
don’t involve perceptual acquaintance, but some do, and most
importantly, acquired olfactory perception does.
The simplest attention to one’s own experience, according to
Reid, is sufficient to show that there are cases of acquired per-
ception that are phenomenally immediate. Taking the example of
a hearing the sound of a rolling coach as such, it would be very
difficult (says Reid—and it seems hard to disagree) to deny that
one’s auditory awareness of the coach presents itself as unmedi-
ated by awareness of anything else (IHM 2.6, 38). It does not seem
phenomenally to be the case that we first hear low-level auditory
properties and then, in virtue of that perception, come separately
to hear the sounds as emanating from horse feet. Reid says that
we can hardly be convinced that our acquired perceptions are not
innate (EIP 2.9). Indeed, with respect to the acquired perception
of three-dimensional Euclidean figure, the primary reasons for
positing a distinction between acquired and original visual per-
ception are due to third-person conclusions about vision drawn
from, among other things, facts about how painters simulate
perceptions of three-dimensional shape with two-dimensional
figures, and from the perceptual reports of patients whose con-
genital cataracts are removed. Phenomenally speaking, acquired
perception is just as immediate a form of awareness of exter-
nal objects as original perception. This fact is, for Reid, largely
responsible for why the distinction between acquired and original
perception is not to be found in ordinary language (EIP 2.9).
Whether cases of acquired perception are psychologically non-
inferential is a harder question to answer. On the one hand, we
might tempted to say no, because it seems to involve first having
an original perception; e.g., we originally just see visible figure,
and then seeing visible figure causes us to see “real” or “tan-
gible” figure. One could thus cast the psychological move from
one perception to the next as a form of inference. On the other
hand, the grounds for so casting it are unclear. It is doubtful,
or at the very least open to debate, that the mere existence of a
causal transition between contentful states is sufficient to consti-
tute inference (Boghossian, in press). Even if it were true, it still
seems that classic worries about the inferentiality of perceptual
awareness arise not from mere worries about causal state tran-
sitions, but rather from the worry that the states that arise later
in the causal chain are dependent in some richer sense on the
earlier states. That is, the worry that the perception of 3D fig-
ure is mediated by inference is really a worry that perception of
3D figure is somehow derivative of perception of 2D figure; that
16For instance, given that the visual perception of shape does not constitu-
tively involve sensation for Reid [though see Yaffe (2003a)], the points about
sensory character might not apply. In the case of auditory perception of the
size of a bell, on the other hand, the sensory character seems crucial to its
constituting acquaintance.
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our representation of 3D figure involves an inference according
to some inferential scheme, If there is 2D figure x, then there must
be 3D figure y. There is no reason to think perception of 3D fig-
ure by mature adults on Reid’s account involves anything more
robust than a brute-causal relation between perceptual states. In
the absence of a reason to think that relation is inferential, and
given its phenomenal immediacy, we can tentatively assume it to
be noninferential17.
Acquired perception also involves direct causal relations to the
environment. It is well-known that spelling out the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the kind of direct causal relations that
are required for veridical perception is tricky, given the existence
of deviant causal chains (Chisholm, 1957; Grice, 1961; Dretske,
1981, 2003; Searle, 1983; Burge, 2010). In the typical 3D percep-
tion case, however (assuming there is some proper causal story to
tell), the object’s having the 3D shape it does clearly plays the cru-
cial causal role in bringing about the veridical perception of that
shape. Similarly for the size of the bell one hears, or the horse’s
hooves, and so on for many standard cases of Reidian acquired
perception.
Typically, acquired perceptions have sensory character, with
the major (though arguable) exception of the visual perception of
shape18. With respect to the higher-order notion of sensory char-
acter, the case for the introspective inextricability of the sensory
and intentional components of perceptual experience appears to
be just as strong for cases of acquired perception as for original
perception. To create an example, hearing a voice as the voice
of a particular friend seems phenomenally intertwined with the
qualitative character of the auditory sensations involved; and sim-
ilarly, of course, for hearing the sounds of the coach grinding the
cobblestones, and so on.
It is less clear whether acquired perceptions occupy the same
sort of tight causal relations to sensations as original percep-
tions. It is an open question whether or not acquired perceptions
always causally depend on prior token original perceptions that
causally mediate sensation and acquired perception. Here is a
reason to think that they do not. Reid simply does not have
much of an account of the process of perceptual learning and
how it enables acquired perception to occur. What little he does
say is essentially that there is a constantly reinforced habitua-
tion process. Given just that meager constraint on how percep-
tual learning takes place, then it seems possible not only that
acquired perception could occur on the onset of original percep-
tion, but also that the sensations themselves could give rise to an
acquired perception immediately and concurrently with original
perception19 .
17In Quilty-Dunn (2013), I argued that the perception of 3D figure could be
considered immediate noninferential perception if it was the sort of awareness
that is proprietary to perception (and not mere thought), echoing (Van Cleve,
2004). This was vague and unexplored; the notion of perceptual acquaintance
outlined here should provide a clearer and more substantive account of what
makes a certain form of awareness count as perceptual awareness.
18See Yaffe (2003a), Falkenstein and Grandi (2003), Yaffe (2003b) for an
extended discussion of whether the visual perception of shape constitutively
involves sensation.
19See Goldstone (1998) for an overview of various mechanisms of perceptual
learning that could underwrite such a process.
Suppose a given array of sensation-types, S, is innately hooked
up to a certain original perception-type, P, and that perceptual
learning enables one to have a token of the acquired perception-
type, A, upon having a token of P. Abstracting from problem
cases, every time a token of A occurs, a token of P occurs first;
and every time P occurs, S occurs first. Then (again, limiting
to the typical cases), it follows that any habituation or condi-
tioning process that reinforces a connection between P and A
will also reinforce a connection between S and A. S could there-
fore, at some point, simply give rise to A directly. There may
be theoretical reasons why this could not happen—something
about the mechanism that gives rise to A could preclude mere
sensations from being causally sufficient, for example—but such
reasons do not fall out of Reid’s account. In the absence of a
reason to think it cannot happen, then, since the bare bones of
Reid’s account imply that S could cause A directly, it seems that
we can tentatively say that Reidian acquired perception can hook
up to sensation directly. Even if that were not the case, and the
connection between S and A must always be mediated by P, it
seems that one could still consider that mediated relation a kind
of tight causal connection that is sufficient for A to have sen-
sory character and thus to be different from mere thought. Of
course many thoughts have causal connections to sensations, but
not the reliable causal structure of S—>P, P—>A. Acquired per-
ceptions thus typically have sensory character in both the causal
and higher-order senses.
TESTING THE CONDITIONS
The above has hopefully sufficed to show that acquired perception
fulfills the four (or five) conditions I have laid out for perceptual
acquaintance. Maybe so, one might reply, but then so much the
worse for those conditions. The reply may be that the conditions
specified for perceptual acquaintance are too liberal, and that is
the only reason why acquired perception looks like a species of
perceptual acquaintance. Van Cleve’s (2004, in press) helpful chal-
lenge to those who support the notion of acquired perception
as perceptual acquaintance (e.g., Copenhaver, 2010) is to explain
why his “seeing” that his wife is home by seeing her keys on the
table does not fit the rubric for perception established by acquired
perception. The spirit of the challenge is to show that construing
acquired perception as a form of perceptual acquaintance doesn’t
just broaden the category of perception into triviality. This chal-
lenge is important because acquired perception has been invoked
at crucial moments in the secondary literature on Reid to avoid
Reid’s theory of perception lapsing into incoherence or obvious
falsity. For example, construing acquired perception as genuine
perception is necessary to avoid saying that Reid’s theory of the
visual perception of the real shapes of objects amounts to indirect
realism (Copenhaver, 2010; Quilty-Dunn, 2013), which is incon-
sistent with his fervent arguments against the idea that perception
is indirect.
Fair enough, then: does van Cleve’s example satisfy all the
above conditions? It does not satisfy phenomenal immediacy. If
van Cleve sees his wife’s keys and “sees that” she is home, then it
seems obvious that he can phenomenally distinguish two distinct
acts of awareness and the asymmetric dependence relation that
holds between them. One is aware of the set of keys, and aware
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that one’s wife is home; furthermore, one is aware that the lat-
ter awareness is based on the former. Perhaps van Cleve would
question that description of the phenomenology, but I find it
difficult to see how it could be incorrect. If that’s right, then the
“perception” is not phenomenally immediate.
His awareness is also psychologically inferential. Unless the
phenomenology is radically inadequate, then the inference drawn
from the presence of the keys to van Cleve’s wife being home is
not only present but manifest in the experience. It also seems like
the most obvious psychological interpretation of the situation is
that he perceives the keys, thinks that if the keys are there then
his wife is home, and draws the inference that his wife is home.
In the absence of a reason to think otherwise, it seems from the
first-person and third-person points of view that the case clearly
involves inference.
Van Cleve’s awareness of his wife is also not directly causally
related to her. There is a causal connection between her and van
Cleve’s perception (viz., she put the keys there and they caused his
perception) but it is not the kind that is unique to perception. This
point relies on there being an account of the right kind of causal
relation, which I cannot provide here. For one, however, when
we are talking about visual perception, it could be argued that
the direct causal relation must be carried out primarily through
the medium of ambient light. There is no direct connection via
ambient light between van Cleve and his wife, so it seems fair to
say he is not visually acquainted with her20. By contrast, there is
a direct connection through light between van Cleve and the 3D
shape of the keys, so he may be visually acquainted with their 3D
shape21.
Finally, van Cleve’s intentional state directed toward his wife
does not have sensory character. Focusing first on the higher-
order notion, one could very likely pull apart the sensory qual-
itative character and the intentional state from the first-person
with ease. The visual sensations would likely not seem inextrica-
bly wrapped up with one’s awareness of a person who is absent
from one’s field of vision. Regarding the causal notion, the issue
is a bit more difficult. On the one hand, there is a kind of causal
connection between the sensations and van Cleve’s awareness of
his wife’s being home. On the other hand, it seems that it is not
the same kind that obtains between, for example, my auditory
20Perhaps there could be visual perception, with the same sensory qualita-
tive character and perceptual contents, via a distinct medium (e.g., using a
prosthetic eye that relies on sonar, or to borrow from Daniels, 1974, sensi-
tivity to gravitational fields). These issues present a thorny set of problems.
Nonetheless, in the case we are considering, there is nothing to replace the
ambient light, so such problems should not arise.
21Copenhaver claims that a certain amount of “practical engagement” with
a perceptible property that is “prevalent in one’s environment” (Copenhaver,
2010, p. 305) can facilitate acquired perception. This condition is problematic,
however, since it is compatible with the case currently being examined becom-
ing, through the right sort of practical engagement, an instance of perceptual
acquaintance (Ibid.). It seems to me that it is impossible to be perceptually
acquainted with someone who is not in one’s field of vision. The condi-
tion of a causal connection via a proprietary causal medium—e.g., ambient
light—suffices to rule out such a case. In any case, practical engagement is
arguably successful in giving rise to acquired perception only insofar as it facil-
itates the right kind of perceptual learning, which might be facilitated through
non-practical modes of interaction with the relevant perceptible property.
sensations, and my awareness of the C-minor chord in the song
I hear. What exactly this difference consists in is hard to say, but
that there is a difference in kind seems clear. Perhaps it consists in
the subject’s history of perceptual learning. If one studies music
for years, one develops a very close causal tie between certain
auditory sensation-types and awareness of certain musical prop-
erties; there does not seem to be a similar close causal tie, learned
through normal processes of perceptual learning, for seeing one’s
wife to be home upon seeing her keys on the table.
Furthermore, with respect to ordinary acquired perception,
I argued above that it seems open that the causal connec-
tion between sensations and acquired perceptions could come
to obtain without being mediated by original perceptions. One
might protest, for whatever reason, that this never actually hap-
pens. Even so, there is a difference between ordinary cases of
acquired perception and the case with the keys on the table, which
is that in the latter case, it seems impossible that it could happen.
It is very difficult to see how themere sensations could simply give
rise to van Cleve’s awareness of wife. It seems more natural to say
that they give rise to such awareness only by first giving rise to an
awareness of the keys themselves, leading to an inference that his
wife is home.
If this discussion has been correct, then typical cases of Reidian
acquired perception satisfy all the conditions laid out for percep-
tual acquaintance, and van Cleve’s seeing that his wife is home by
seeing her keys on the table satisfies none of them (certainly not all
of them, in any case). These conditions thus fulfill the desiderata
of enabling acquired perception to constitute perceptual acquain-
tance while ruling out the case of the keys on the table, i.e.,
avoiding triviality. It should be fair to appeal to them, then, in
deciding whether acquired olfactory perception of the secondary
quality of odor is possible. All we need to ask is whether acquired
olfactory perception satisfies most or all of the conditions for
perceptual acquaintance.
OLFACTORY PERCEPTUAL ACQUAINTANCE
It is important to keep in mind the important characteristics of
acquired olfactory perception mentioned in Two Solutions. The
olfactory conceptions that form constituent elements of acquired
olfactory perception are, in terms of their semantic properties,
relative notions of whatever quality is causally responsible for gen-
erating certain types of sensations. Nonetheless, though that is
Reid’s semantic account of such conceptions, when they figure
in an occurrent olfactory perception, they need not represent the
odor by explicitly appealing to its relation to the occurrent sensa-
tion. There is a principled difference between, on the one hand,
representing one’s occurrent olfactory sensation O∗ followed by
representing there to be a causal relation between it and some
external quality O, and on the other hand, having O∗ and then
simply representing external quality O, without the latter repre-
sentation being mediated by representing O∗ and without explic-
itly representing the relation between the tokens of O and O∗.
Both ways of becoming aware of O do involve relations to O∗,
because both are caused by O∗, and because the perceiver’s notion
of O is a notion of some external quality that bears a certain causal
relation to sensations of type O∗. But the first kind of aware-
ness involves inferring there to be some quality O that causes this
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token O∗ sensation; the second kind simply involves represent-
ing there to be O, and the notion of O happens to be a notion
of the kind of thing that causes sensations of type O∗. The sec-
ond kind of awareness does not involve an occurrently mediated
form of awareness. It is both phenomenally immediate and psy-
chologically noninferential, thus satisfying those two conditions
for perceptual acquaintance.
The acquired olfactory perception of O also stands in a direct
causal relation to the instance of O itself in the environment.
There is particularly good reason to say so if, as suggested in the
previous section, the crucial causal connection for a given sen-
sory modality involves the medium that is proprietary to that
modality. Certainly typical olfactory perception will involve such
a connection to the olfactory qualities of external objects. Reid
describes the medium of olfaction as involving “effluvia” (i.e., air-
borne particles) emanating from objects, so olfactory perceptual
states are causally related to olfactory qualities of external objects
via that medium.
Olfactory sensations are also quite intimately bound up with
the intentionality of olfactory perception, and thus imbue that
intentionality with sensory character in both senses mentioned
in the previous section. As far as our ordinary consciousness and
even reflective introspective awareness of olfactory perception is
concerned, for Reid, we do not separate the qualitative charac-
ter of the sensations from the perception of the external olfactory
quality. According to at least the early Reid in IHM, our terms
for the qualitative aspects of odors are better understood to refer
to the qualitative characters of olfactory sensations than to exter-
nal olfactory properties, so closely are olfactory sensation and
perceptual intentionality bound up in consciousness and intro-
spection (IHM 2.2, 27). With respect to the causal construal of
sensory character, acquired olfactory perceptual states are closely
keyed to olfactory sensations. This condition is only met once
adequate perceptual learning has taken place, but once it has,
then the relevant acquired perceptions are caused directly by the
sensations22.
By all the standards set above for perceptual acquain-
tance, acquired olfactory perception plainly constitutes such
acquaintance.
CONCLUSION
I have tried to resolve the tension between Reid’s theory of per-
ception and his account of our conception of odors. It has long
been noted in the secondary literature that acquired perception is
required, but problems still lingered. Two points are really central
to preserving the coherence of Reid’s theory. First, it is neces-
sary to make clear the distinction between the semantics of our
conceptions of odors involving relations to sensation, and our
occurrent perceptual awareness of them being subjectively predi-
cated on relations to occurrent sensations. Second, it is necessary
to argue that some instances of acquired perception, including
olfactory perception, do constitute perceptual acquaintance such
as to block van Cleve’s negative arguments.
22In fact, the issue about whether the causal connection between sensation
and acquired perception must be mediated by an original perception does not
even arise on the interpretation advanced here, according to which there is no
original perception in olfaction.
According to the resulting interpretation, our notions of odors
are based on inferring their causal relations to our sensations,
but they can be perceived noninferentially through acquired per-
ceptual acquaintance. Reid’s theory of olfactory perception is
therefore coherent, and for contemporary philosophers, perhaps
attractive. A Reidian account allows one to explain the qualitative
character of olfactory experience in terms of perceptual sensa-
tion, and to explain the intentional or representational aspect of
such experience without having to adopt anything more robust
than a dispositional (or dispositional-base) account of odors. It
also provides, given the interpretation advanced above, a relatively
tidy explanation of the acquisition of our capacity to represent
dispositional properties such as odors in perception.
There is an odd, and oddly popular, caricature of Reid preva-
lent among present-day philosophers. According to this carica-
ture, Reid thinks that all phenomenal character in perception is
due to nonintentional sensations, and that the intentional com-
ponent of perception involves no phenomenal character at all.
Clare Batty, for instance, writes, “If we take it that Reidian sensa-
tions are one and the same as what we now think of as experiences,
then Reid himself also held that olfactory experiences are purely
sensational” (Batty, 2010a, p. 520; see also Siegel, 2011, p. 21;
Smith, 2002, p. 70). If the terms of the present-day debate were
explained to him, it seems far more likely that Reid would say per-
ceptual experience is not merely a matter of sensation but also of
the intentional component of perception—which, I have argued,
constitutes perceptual acquaintance. It would be hard for him to
deny, for example, that visual perceptual intentionality affects the
way things look to the subject, which seems sufficient for its affect-
ing visual phenomenology. By the same token, representing there
to be a certain odor in an object or in the environment will affect
the way things seem to the subject in her olfactory perceptual
experience.
Reid’s account of olfaction thus allows for both a represen-
tational account of our experiences of odors as properties of
objects or environments, and also for an account of the qualita-
tive character of olfactory perceptual experience, while requiring
no more substantial an ontological commitment than to disposi-
tional properties (or their bases). Reid’s account is also consistent
with a representational account that locates odors in the object
(which is how he sometimes talks), or with one that “locates”
them simply as immanent in one’s immediate environment (see
IHM 6.8, 99; see Batty, 2010a for discussion of the relative merits
of these views).
Finally, one need not be wedded to Reid’s dual-component
(sensation and belief) view of perception to make use of his
account. One could instead say that our notion of odor is relative
to our notion of the qualitative properties of olfactory experi-
ences (without regarding those properties to be instantiated in
states called sensations) and that the intentional or represen-
tational contents of those experiences can come to incorporate
acquired representations of odors as dispositions or dispositional
bases, without supposing the intentional/representational com-
ponent to involve belief, as Reid does. Anyone who endorses
a distinction between the qualitative and intentional aspects of
perceptual states might thus be able to employ Reidian ideas—
which should be a particularly attractive option for theorists who
also take odors and other secondary qualities to be dispositional
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properties. A Reidian theory of olfactory perception should, for
all these reasons, be considered a live option in contemporary
debates on olfaction and secondary qualities generally.
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